Date when decision was rendered: 22.6.1992

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2456; 244 and 286/1/91

Reference to source

KHO 1992-A-1.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1992 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1992 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1992 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1993

Pages: pp. 9-27

Subject

access to court, right to property, equality before the law,
rätt till domstolsprövning, äganderätt, likhet inför lagen,
oikeus tuomioistuinkäsittelyyn, omistusoikeus, tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 3 and 4-1 of the Administrative Appeals Act, section 41 of the Constitution Act (and unspecified references to Sections 5 and 6), sections 13, 246-1 and 47 of the Standing Orders of the Council of State

= lag om ändringssökande i förvaltningsärenden 3 § och 4 § 1 mom., regeringsformen 41 § (och ospecificerade hänvisningar till 5 § och 6 §), reglemente för statsrådet 13 §, 246 § 1 mom. och 47 §

= laki muutoksenhausta hallintoasioissa 3 § ja 4 § 1 mom., hallitusmuoto 41 § (ja määrittelemättömät viitteet 5 § ja 6 §),valtioneuvoston ohjesääntö 13 §, 246 § 1 mom. ja 47 §.

ECHR-6-1 (unspecified); ECHRP-1-1 (unspecified)

Abstract

Riparian owners had the right to challenge, in the Supreme Administrative Court, the lawfulness of a national shore conservation plan approved by the Cabinet.After examining the merits of complaints by certain owners, the Court upheld the plan.

The Council of State, ie. the Cabinet, had in December 1990 approved a national shore conservation plan.The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that this decision had consequences of legal relevance for riparian owners, and that the owners therefore had the right to appeal against the Cabinet decision.The Court cited the petition of appeal filed by a group of land owners who were of the opinion that the decision violated the constitutional provisions on the right to property and on equality before the law, as well as international treaties on human rights binding on Finland.According to the ruling of the Court, the Cabinet had neither exceeded its authority nor committed a procedural error.The Cabinet decision did not have such immediate effects on the position of the land owners that it therefore would have been unlawful.There existed sufficient reasons for including the shore areas owned by the applicants in the conservation plan.The Supreme Administrative Court therefore came to the conclusion that the Cabinet decision did not infringe the rights of the applicants.

23.3.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 25.9.1997

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2353; 4731/2/95

Reference to source

KHO 1997:94.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1997 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1997 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1997 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1998

Pages: pp. 118-133

Subject

right to be heard, right to property,
rätt att höras, äganderätt,
oikeus tulla kuulluksi, omistusoikeus,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 15 of the Administrative Procedure Act; sections 124a and 125 of the Building Act

= lag om förvaltningsförfarande 15 §; byggnadslag 124a §, 125 §

= hallintomenettelylaki 15 §; rakennuslaki 124a §, 125 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

The Ministry of the Environment had issued a prohibition of measures for five years with respect to a fairly large area for the purposes of drawing a master plan.Shortly before the prohibition expired, the county administrative board extended it with another five years.The prohibition of measures made, for example, the logging of trees in the area subject to permission of the municipal executive board.A group of forest owners appealed against the extension of the prohibition of measures to the Ministry of the Environment which dismissed the appeals.Two forest owners appealed further to the Supreme Administrative Court.They referred to the Act on Private Forests and claimed that subjecting such measures to the permission of the municipal executive board violated their rights as forest owners.They also noted that they had not been heard when the decision on the extension of the prohibition was made or when they appealed to the Ministry of the Environment.The Supreme Administrative Court referred to the relevant provisions in the Building Act and the Administrative Procedure Act regarding the hearing of a person whose rights the matter concerns.The Court also referred to Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the ECHR and stated that the principle of proportionality, which emanates from the provisions of Article 1, may presuppose, among other things, that a person is given an opportunity to be heard before a decision concerning his property is made.According to the Act on Private Forests, which was applicable at the time when the decision on the extension of the prohibition of measures was made, no official permit was necessary for the logging of trees in a private forest.The Act also applied to areas subjected to prohibition of measures for the purposes of drawing a master plan.The Court stated that in this case the prohibition of logging restricted the right of the forest owners to carry on their trade, especially since the area subjected to the prohibition was large and, by hearing the persons concerned, it could have been possible to limit the prohibition as to cover only certain parts of the area.It would have been possible to hear the forest owners regarding the extension of the prohibition while the original prohibition was still in force.This would not have jeopardized the realization of the purpose of the prohibition of measures and would not have postponed the decision-making in the matter.Therefore, the county administrative board should not have made the decision on the extension of the prohibition without hearing the forest owners.The Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the county administrative board and the Ministry of the Environment.The case was reassigned to the Environment Agency, which during the course of the proceedings had become the competent administrative authority instead of the county administrative board.

2.4.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 8.11.1994

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 4114; R92/676

Reference to source

KKO 1994:114.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1994 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1994 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1994 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1995

Pages: pp. 502-510

Subject

trade, right to property, constitution,
handel, äganderätt, grundlagen,
kauppa, omistusoikeus, perustuslaki,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 2 of the Decree on foreign trade and securing of economic growth (162/1974); sections 1 to 3 of the Act on foreign trade and securing of economic growth (157/1974); sections 6 and 92-2 of the Constitution Act

= förordning om utrikeshandel och säkrande av ekonomisk tillväxt (162/1974) 2 §; lag om utrikeshandel och säkrande av ekonomisk tillväxt (157/1974) 1-3 §, Regeringsformen 6 §, 92 § 2 mom.

= ulkomaankaupan ja taloudellisen kasvun turvaamisesta annettu asetus (162/1974) 2 §; ulkomaankaupan ja taloudellisen kasvun turvaamisesta annettu laki (157/1974) 1-3 §, hallitusmuoto 6 §, 92 § 2 mom.

Abstract

The prosecutor demanded that A and B should be sentenced for having imported steel without an import licence in 1978-1982.A and B claimed that the requirement of a permanent import licence, as prescribed in the Decree on foreign trade and securing of economic growth, was contrary to the Act on foreign trade and securing of economic growth.The court of first instance noted that the Act did not explicitly prohibit the use of permanent import licences and that the relevant provisions of the Decree had not been questioned in previous legal praxis.However, the court concluded that there were extenuating circumstances in the case and considering this, the right to institute criminal proceedings had been time-barred.The charges against A and B were therefore dropped.

The case went further to the court of appeal which noted that import restrictions were possible in specific cases listed in the Act on foreign trade and securing of economic growth and that, according to the Act, it was possible to prescribe on such restrictions in a Decree.However, the Act did not provide for the possibility of an obligatory import licence in this case.The Act had been enacted following the procedure for constitutional amendments as its provisions in some cases meant that legislative power was delegated from the Parliament to an executive authority and as some of the provisions could infringe the freedom of economic activity and the right to property.This being the case, the Act had to be interpreted restrictively.The court of appeal then referred to section 92-2 of the Constitution Act, which prescribes that if a provision in a Decree conflicts with an Act of Parliament, a court shall not apply it.As the relevant provisions of the Decree in this case were in conflict with the Act, the court of appeal did not apply the Decree and dropped the charges as being without a foundation in law.

The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal.As grounds for the restrictive interpretation of the Act, the Supreme Court mainly brought up the delegation of legislative power to an executive authority, whereas one concurring judge emphasized the protection of property rights as prescribed in section 6 of the Constitution Act.

7.4.1998 / 10.10.2012 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 5.5.1999

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1128; M 97/100

Reference to source

KKO 1999:52.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1999 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1999 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1999 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1999

Pages: pp. 371-375

Subject

right to property, compensation,
äganderätt, skadestånd,
omistusoikeus, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 71, 72 and 74 of the Building Act

= byggnadslagen 71 §, 72 §, 74 §

= rakennuslaki 71 §, 72 §, 74 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

After the approval of a town plan, an owner of a land estate had to give up part of his lands to the municipality for the construction of a road.The land was given up partly without compensation, partly against full compensation.According to section 71 of the Building Act, no compensation is paid for a private road or an area which the land owner has reserved to be used as a road, in cases when such a land area is later defined as a road area in a town plan.In other cases, full compensation has to be paid if the land owner so requests (section 72).If giving up the land area to the municipality without compensation causes the land owner harm which considering the circumstances may be regarded as unreasonable, the harm must be compensated (section 74).

In this case, the land owner appealed to the Land Court of Southern Finland and demanded additional compensation for the harm caused to the normal use of his residential house.According to the land court, the road was constructed so close to the house, that the normal use of the house was disturbed.In addition, the land area previously used as a garden had been lost.This caused unreasonable harm to the land owner and he was thus entitled to compensation as provided for in section 74 of the Building Act.When considering whether the harm was unreasonable, the land court noted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR had to be taken into account, among other things, for the reason that Protocol No. 1 had been incorporated into Finnish law in 1990, after the Building Act was enacted (1958).

The municipality appealed to the Supreme Court which stated that the harm caused was not unreasonable.The total area of the land estate was fairly large and the house could be used as a residential building as before.The decision of the land court was quashed as far as it concerned the right to additional compensation for harm caused for the use of the residential house.

14.4.1998 / 3.8.2004 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 20.2.1998

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 588; S96/2297

Reference to source

KKO 1998:21.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1998 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1998 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1998 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1998

Pages: pp. 122-128

Subject

right to property,
äganderätt,
omistusoikeus,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 43 of the Act on Housing Corporations

= lag om bostadsaktiebolag 43 §

= asunto-osakeyhtiölaki 43 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

According to the articles of agreement of a housing corporation, the maintenance charge for shop premises in the corporation was higher than that for apartments and offices.The share holders owning the shop premises considered this as unreasonable and appealed to the court of first instance.According to section 43 of the Act on Housing Corporations, a court may change a provision in the articles of agreement of a housing corporation if the provision results in an unreasonable burden for some share holders in comparison with other share holders.

In this case, other share holders did not consider the use of different maintenance charges as unreasonable.They claimed, among other things, that changing the articles of agreement and the maintenance charges would lead to a decrease in value of their shares and would thus violate their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as prescribed in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.

The court of first instance concluded that the different maintenance charges were unreasonable and should be changed as suggested by the plaintiffs.It also noted that changing the articles of agreement in order to abolish the differentiated treatment of the share holders was to change the legal situation between private parties on grounds emanating from the situation itself.It did not amount to an infringement by force in the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the ECHR.

The case went further to the court of appeal and the Supreme Court which did not share the opinion of the court of first instance.They found that considering the circumstances the use of different maintenance charges was not unreasonable.In their decisions, they did not refer to the ECHR or Protocol No. 1.

23.10.2002 / 1.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 6.10.1998

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2147/1998 (1341/2/97)

Reference to source

KHO 1998:53.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1998 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1998 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1998 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1999

Pages: pp. 143-160

Subject

right to property, equality, taxation,
äganderätt, jämlikhet, beskattning,
omistusoikeus, tasa-arvo, verotus,

Relevant legal provisions

Income Tax Act; sections 5 and 6 of the Constitution Act

= inkomstskattelagen; regeringsformen 5 §, 6 §

= tuloverolaki; hallitusmuoto 5 §, 6 §.

ECHPR-1-1

Abstract

Parliament had enacted a law that increased the taxation of certain forms of income based on the possibility of a company employee to benefit from the company's shares.The law had been amended so that it affected benefits received after the date the Government Bill in question had been presented to Parliament, i.e. with limited retroactive effect.The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the claim that the taxation decision affecting the applicant would violate the right to property, as guaranteed in section 6 of the Constitution Act.The Court stated that the taxation in question did not violate Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.Furthermore, the Court dismissed the claim that the taxation would violate the right to equal treatment, as prescribed in section 5 of the Constitution Act.

23.10.2002 / 27.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 5.5.2000

Judicial body: Administrative Court of Hämeenlinna = Tavastehus förvaltningsdomstol = Hämeenlinnan hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 00/311/4; 00246/00/5730, 00247/00/5730

Reference to source

Electronic database for administrative court decisions within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för beslut av förvaltningsdomstolar inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin hallinto-oikeuksien päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, right to property, legal protection, access to court, limitations of rights and freedoms,
rättvis rättegång, äganderätt, rättsskydd, rätt till domstolsprövning, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, omistusoikeus, oikeusturva, oikeus tuomioistuinkäsittelyyn, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 9 and 9b of Act on passenger road transport which is subject to licence (343/1991); section 18 of the Constitution Act

= lag om tillståndspliktig persontrafik på väg 9 §, 9b §; grundlagen 18 §

= laki luvanvaraisesta henkilöliikenteestä tiellä 9 §, 9b §; perustuslaki 18 §.

ECHR-6-1; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

The county administrative board refused to renew A's licence to provide taxi services.A had plenty of unpaid taxes and other payments which resulted from his taxi business and were being claimed by the authorities through execution proceedings.A could not be regarded as having a good financial standing or being able to take care of his obligations and did not therefore fulfill the requirements for granting a licence as provided for in section 9 of the Act on passenger road transport.A appealed to the administrative court and referred to Article 6-1 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.A claimed that the licence itself constituted his possessions.As the matter was concerning A's civil rights, it should not have been decided by an administrative authority but by a court.

According to the administrative court, Article 6-1 of the ECHR did not presuppose that all matters concerning freedom of occupation or the protection of property should be in the first hand decided by a court.Instead the provision calls for the possibility of a fair trial in case a person wishes to appeal against the decision.The court noted that A had this possibility.Regarding Protocol No. 1, the court drew attention to the fact that, according to Article 1, it is possible to restrict the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions provided the restriction is proportional, in the public interest and subject to conditions provided for by law.In the court's opinion, the state may take active measures to restrict competition in the taxi branch in order to guarantee the quality of the service and the livelihood of the taxi entrepreneurs.It is justified to say that avoiding statutory taxes and payments could result in the distortion of competition and in inequality among the entrepreneurs on the branch.The requirement concerning the good financial status of the licence holder was thus not in contradiction with Protocol No. 1.

The court further noted that the requirements for obtaining a licence were unambiguous and clear enough to fulfill the criteria of being "provided by an Act", as prescribed in section 18 of the Constitution Act, concerning the right of everyone to freely choose his or her occupation.There was thus no contradiction with the Constitution Act.

The Supreme Administrative Court did not change the decision of the administrative court (decision of 28 February 2001, Report No. 331).

28.10.2002 / 8.5.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 15.6.2000

Judicial body: Administrative Court of Hämeenlinna = Tavastehus förvaltningsdomstol = Hämeenlinnan hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 00/403/4; 00068/00/5730

Reference to source

Electronic database for administrative court decisions within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för beslut av förvaltningsdomstolar inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin hallinto-oikeuksien päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

right to property, right to work,
äganderätt, rätt till arbete,
omistusoikeus, oikeus työhön,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 2, 10 and 20 of the Act on passenger road transport which is subject to licence (343/1991); section 18 of the Constitution Act

= lag om tillståndspliktig persontrafik på väg 2 §, 10 § och 20 §; grundlagen 18 §

= laki luvanvaraisesta henkilöliikenteestä tiellä 2 §, 10 § ja 20 §; perustuslaki 18 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

The administrative court overturned the decision of the county administrative board, by which the board had revoked A's taxi licence for a certain period of time because A had mainly operated outside the area specified in the licence and thus in violation of the licence conditions.The court took the view that the decision had infringed on A's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and the right to earn his livelihood.In its decision, the court referred to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR and section 18 of the Constitution Act (on the right to work and the freedom to engage in commercial activity).

In the court's view, revoking the licence was a very severe measure, considering that the county administrative board would have had other, less severe measures at its disposal.The measure was not in just proportion to the public interest the county administrative board wished to guard (i.e. regional traffic policy).The provisions in the Act on passenger road transport and in regulations based on that Act concerning the legal relevance of specifying the area within which a taxi entrepreneur could operate were unclear and open to various interpretations.As the case was concerning limitations to the legal right to carry on a trade, possible gaps in legislation could not be interpreted to the detriment of the entrepreneur.

The Supreme Administrative Court did not change the decision of the administrative court (Report No. 2091; decision of 6 September 2002).

9.5.2003 / 5.8.2003 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 31.12.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3444; 1584/1/03

Reference to source

KHO 2003:102.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2003 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2003 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2003 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2007

Pages: pp. 654-661

Subject

equality, legal protection, right to property,
jämlikhet, rättsskydd, äganderätt,
tasa-arvo, oikeusturva, omistusoikeus,

Relevant legal provisions

section 191-3 of the Land Use and Building Act; sections 6, 15, 21 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= markanvändnings- och bygglag 191 § 3 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 15 §, 21 § och 22 §

= maankäyttö- ja rakennuslaki 191 § 3 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 15 §, 21 § ja 22 §

Abstract

The municipal authorities had drawn up a shore plan which had been approved by the municipal council.In the shore plan the estate owned by D had been designated an area for the construction of holiday homes.The owners of the neighbouring estates appealed against the municipal council's decision to the administrative court which revoked the decision as far as the construction area designated for D's estate was concerned.The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed D's appeal on the basis of section 191-3 of the Land Use and Building Act which prescribes that only local authorities are entitled to appeal a decision of the administrative court revoking the local authority's decision to approve a land use plan or a building ordinance.If a detailed shore plan has been drawn up by a landowner, however, the landowner is entitled to appeal the decision of the administrative court.The Supreme Administrative Court decided the matter by a vote (5-4).The judges left in the minority referred to sections 6 (equality before the law as well as to various provisions in the Land Use and Building Act concerning appeal in planning issues.According to the judges, the quoted provisions show that landowners should be guaranteed equal rights and equal treatment in planning issues.They noted that the prohibition of appeal in section 191-3 was an exception to the general rules of appeal, which provide for a possibility to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against a decision of an administrative court in planning issues.The judges pointed out that when a plan is revoked with regard to a small restricted area only, it may happen that the area is completely left outside a land use plan and, for example, construction on the area is not possible in practice.When the administrative court revokes a part of a plan, it simultaneously takes a stand as to the interpretation of the Land Use and Building Act and its provisions pertaining to the matter.If the prohibition of appeal applies in these situations, the landowner cannot have the decision of the administrative court reviewed by a higher court.Therefore, the judges suggested a narrow interpretation of section 191-3: the prohibition of appeal should not apply to a landowner's appeal in cases where an administrative court has revoked a shore plan with regard to a small restricted area.Consequently, the Supreme Administrative Court should have considered D's appeal.

20.1.2005 / 3.7.2009 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 25.3.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1663; M2000/36

Reference to source

KKO 2004:26.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2004 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2004 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2004 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: pp. 161-172

Subject

right to property, compensation,
äganderätt, skadestånd,
omistusoikeus, vahingonkorvaus,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 9 and 11 of the Act on the Protection of Buildings; sections 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= byggnadsskyddslag 9 § och 11 §; grundlagen 15 § och 106 §

= rakennussuojelulaki 9 § ja 11 §; perustuslaki 15 § ja 106 §

Abstract

On the basis of the Act on the Protection of Buildings, environment authorities had decided on a temporary prohibition concerning alterations to certain business premises owned by a housing corporation.While the decision on a possible protection of the premises was pending, the corporation was not to take any measures which would endanger the historical value of the interior of the premises as a pharmacy.The proposal for protection was later rejected.The housing corporation demanded compensation from the state on the grounds that the temporary prohibition had prevented the corporation from letting out the premises and had thus resulted in a loss of income.Rents from the business premises had been the housing corporation's main source of income.The lower appeal instances had rejected the claim as being without a foundation in law.Section 11 of the Act on the Protection of Buildings contains grounds for compensation after a decision on protection has been made but does not say anything about compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition.The Supreme Court discussed section 11 against the background of the protection of property in section 15 of the Constitution Act and considered whether there was a possible conflict between the two provisions in this case.The Court referred to the preparatory materials of the Act on the Protection of Buildings.Regarding the lack of provisions on compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition, the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament had pointed out that there is no conflict with the constitutional protection of property provided that certain conditions are fulfilled.First, the temporary prohibition should only mean a duty not to demolish the building or to make alterations which would jeopardize its historical value.Secondly, the prohibition should not prevent the normal use of the building, its use in a manner from which the owner of the building gains reasonable benefit, or its use for another purpose than previously.The Constitutional Law Committee also regarded it necessary that in cases in which a temporary protection is not followed by a decision on protection and the task of maintaining the building exceeds the duties prescribed in law, those upon whom the prohibition has been imposed should have a right to compensation for damage which in their circumstances is unreasonable.The Supreme Court noted that the clear and carefully considered wording of section 11 did not allow an expansive interpretation of the provision so as to cover compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition.When the Act was drafted it had been presupposed that a temporary prohibition would not result in an interruption in a regular income from property as had in fact happened in this case.In the Supreme Court's view, being left without compensation in this case violates the protection of property as prescribed in section 15 of the Constitution Act.According to section 106 of the Constitution Act, if the application of an Act would be in evident conflict with the Constitution, the court shall give primacy to the provision in the Constitution.With reference to sections 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the housing corporation had a right to compensation under section 11 of the Act on the Protection of Buildings.The matter was decided by a vote (7-4).Five justices based this outcome on an evident conflict between section 15 of the Constitution Act and the pertinent provision in the ordinary law.Two concurring justices suggested that the conflict between provisions could be avoided by using a method of interpretation which is favourable to human rights.By means of a "human rights-friendly" interpretation, section 11 could be considered to include a right to compensation for damage caused by a temporary prohibition in a case such as this.Altogether four dissenting justices were of the opinion that the housing corporation had no right to compensation.Two of them agreed that a "human rights-friendly" interpretation of section 11 was possible.However, in this case the difficulties in letting out the business premises were only partially due to the temporary prohibition and the inconvenience caused to the housing corporation was not unreasonable.On the same grounds, two justices concluded that the lack of right to compensation did not lead to an evident conflict between section 11 and the Constitution Act in this case.

20.1.2005 / 2.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 28.6.2002

Judicial body: Rovaniemi Court of Appeal = Rovaniemi hovrätt = Rovaniemen hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 414; R02/86

Reference to source

RHO 2002:15.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

right to property, right to work,
äganderätt, rätt till arbete,
omistusoikeus, oikeus työhön,

Relevant legal provisions

Act on fishing in the Tornio River area (494/1997); sections 15 and 18 of the Constitution Act

= lag om fiske inom Torne älvs fiskeområde (494/1997); grundlagen 15 § och 18 §

= laki kalastuksesta Torniojoen kalastusalueella (494/1997); perustuslaki 15 § ja 18 §.

Abstract

By its decision, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had restricted fishing by fixed gear in the Tornio River fishing area between 1 May and 5 July.The purpose of the restriction was to protect wild salmon and to secure the continuation of the fishing of wild salmon in the area.A, B and C had acted in violation of this decision by fishing in the area by fixed gear during the restriction period.The prosecutor brought charges against A, B and C, but the court of first instance decided the case in the defendants' favour.The court held, among other things, that the Ministry's decision was in violation of the Constitution Act and infringed upon the defendants' right to normal and reasonable use of their property and their right to earn their livelihood.Following the prosecutor's appeal, the court of appeal quashed the lower court's decision and sentenced the defendants to a fine.The court of appeal found that the fishing restrictions imposed by the Ministry were sufficiently specified, justified anc necessary for the preservation of wild salmon in the area.The Ministry's decision was based on authorization granted in the Act on fishing in the Tornio River area.During the restriction period, which was fairly short, it was possible to catch other fish than salmon or trout, either by special permission or by other than fixed fishing gear.Moreover, the restrictions applied equally to all those who had fishing rights in the area and were also to their benefit, because the restrictions contributed to the preservation of a sustainable stock of wild salmon in the area.The court of appeal concluded that the fishing restrictions did not violate the defendants' constitutional right to property and did not amount to an unreasonable limitation of their constitutional right to work and to earn their livelihood.The decision is final.The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (Report No. 1446; decision of 11 June 2003).

26.5.2006 / 26.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 27.2.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 442; 1966/1/07

Reference to source

KHO 2009:24.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2009 January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2009 januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2009 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2010

Pages: pp. 225-233

Subject

social rights, right to property, right to housing, equality before the law,
sociala rättigheter, äganderätt, rätt till bostad, likhet inför lagen,
sosiaaliset oikeudet, omistusoikeus, oikeus asuntoon, tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 1, 2, 7b, 7c, 10c and 11 of the Act on client fees in social welfare and health care; sections 1 and 15 of the Decree on client fees in social welfare and health care; sections 6-1, 15-1 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om klientavgifter inom social- och hälsovården 1 §, 2 §, 7b §, 7c §, 10c § och 11 §; förordning om klientavgifter inom social- och hälsorvården 1 § och 15 §; grundlagen 6 § 1 mom., 15 § 1 mom. och 22 §

= laki sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon asiakasmaksuista 1 §, 2 §, 7b §, 7c §, 10c § ja 11 §; asetus sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon asiakasmaksuista 1 § ja 15 §; perustuslaki 6 § 1 mom., 15 § 1 mom. ja 22 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

A municipal social welfare board had made a policy decision to the effect that persons in long-term institutional care would be charged a client fee in accordance with the Act on client fees in social welfare and health care, but the person's costs of living in rented or owner-occupied home would no longer be taken into account when determining the amoung of the fee.X asked the board to rectify its decision, claiming that the decision had no basis in law and was in conflict with several constitutional rights, among them equality before the law, the protection of property and the right to housing.The board rejected X's request.When the administrative court had rejected X's appeal, X filed an appeal in the Supreme Administrative Court.

In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the municipalities can determine the amount of client fees within the limits prescribed in the Act and Decree on client fees in social welfare and health care.According to the Act, those in long-term institutional care will be charged a fee which is set taking into consideration the person's solvency and monthly income.The Act also lists the costs that are to be deducted from the monthly income before determining the amount of the fee.Housing costs are not mentioned among such costs.In taking housing costs into consideration when determining the client fee for persons in long-term institutional care, the social welfare board had thus granted an additional benefit as compared to the provisions of the Act.The Supreme Administrative Court found that in making the decision and in reversing it later, the board had not exceeded its discretion or authority.In the Court's opinion, the board's decision was not contrary to law nor in conflict with the protection of property as prescribed in the Constitution Act and the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR or with the constitutional provisions on equality and non-discrimination.The Court continued by pointing out that the Act on client fees also provides for the possibility to waive or reduce a client fee, for example, if collecting the fee would jeopardize a person's income or the income of that person's family.The Court concluded that, by its policy decision, the board had not conclusively resolved whether housing costs could be deducted from the monthly income before determining the amount of the fee.Rather, this question is considered on a case-by-case basis.Moreover, the decision by which a client fee is determined can be appealed under the Act on client fees.The Supreme Administrative Court rejected X's appeal.

23.11.2009 / 21.10.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 15.12.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2562; S2009/88

Reference to source

KKO 2009:91.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2009 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2009 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2009 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2010

Pages: pp. 666-672

Subject

respect for private life, right to property, right to the inviolability of the home,
respekt för privatliv, äganderätt, rätt till hemmets okränkbarhet,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, omistusoikeus, kotirauhan suoja,

Relevant legal provisions

chapter 18, section 2 and chapter 19, sections 12-1 and 13 of the Code of Inheritance; sections 10 and 15 of the Constitution Act

= ärvdabalken 18 kapitel 2 §, 19 kapitel 12 § 1 mom. och 19 kapitel 13 §; grundlagen 10 § och 15 §

= perintökaari 18 luku 2 §, 19 luku 12 § 1 mom. ja 19 luku 13 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 15 §.

ECHR-8; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

X had died and left a widow and four children.X had owned an estate in which his son Y had lived for over 45 years, first with his parents and later alone, after his father had died and his mother had moved into a sheltered home for the elderly.The widow and Y's three siblings asked the court of first instance to order that Y moves out and surrenders the estate to the joint administration of the widow and the heirs.The court of first instance decided the case in favour of the widow and the siblings.On Y's appeal, the court of appeal referred the case back to the court of first instance, in order for the lower court to consider the grounds for the eviction claim.The widow and an estate administrator, who had represented the decedent's estate before the court of appeal, appealed to the Supreme Court.

In its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the right to private life and the right to the inviolability of the home as guaranteed in section 10 of the Constitution Act and Article 8 of the ECHR.It also referred to the protection of property in section 15 of the Constitution Act and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.The Court noted that the inviolability of the home cannot be encroached unless such interference is in accordance with the law and necessary in order to protect the rights of other persons, such as the right to property.Moreover, in any decision-making pertaining to the inviolability of the home, the grounds for claims interfering with the inviolability of the home must be properly scrutinized.The Supreme Court noted that the estate administrator had not claimed that Y's living in the estate would prevent the settlement of the decedent's estate.The Court continued that in the court of first instance, it had been disputed whether Y had stopped the widow and the other heirs from using the estate or whether Y's actions were likely to cause damage to the property of the estate or its value.Because the court of first instance had regarded as inadmissible the evidence presented pertaining to these disputed issues, the Supreme Court referred the case back to the court of first instance for rehearing.

15.2.2010 / 14.4.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 16.12.2008

Judicial body: Insurance Court = Försäkringsdomstol = Vakuutusoikeus

Reference: Report no. 273:2007

Reference to source

Electronic database for the decisions of the Insurance Court within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för försäkringsdomstolens beslut inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin vakuutusoikeuden päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

right to property, pension,
äganderätt, pension,
omistusoikeus, eläke,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 8-4-3 and 10-8 of the State Employees' Pensions Act (280/1966); Act (1217/2004) amending the State Employees' Pensions Act, provision on entry into force, subsections 2 and 6; sections 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag om statens pensioner (280/1966) 8 § 4 mom. 3 punkten och 10 § 8 mom.; lag om ändring av lagen om statens pensioner (1217/2004), ikraftträdandebestämmelsen 2 mom. och 6 mom.; grundlagen 15 § och 106 §

= valtion eläkelaki (280/1966) 8 § 4 mom. 3 kohta ja 10 § 8 mom.; valtion eläkelain muuttamisesta annetun lain (1217/2004) voimaantulosäännös 2 mom. ja 6 mom.; perustuslaki 15 § ja 106 §

Abstract

The amended State Employees' Pensions Act had been applied in X's case to the effect that the total amount of his monthly pension was some 1,850 euros smaller than it would have been had the amendments not been made.The decision on X's pension was made by the State Treasury two months after the coming into force of the amendments.The Insurance Court studied the preparatory materials of the amending Act and found that the drafters' intention was not to interfere with the amount of pension accrued before the coming into force of the amendments.Moreover, the amending Act had been enacted as an ordinary Act of Parliament and not in the order prescribed for the enactment of constitutional legislation.Therefore, it was not expected to infringe the right to property as prescribed in the Constitution Act.The Insurance Court also referred to section 106 of the Constitution Act which provides that, if the application of an Act is in evident conflict with the Constitution, the court shall give primacy to the provision in the Constitution.The Insurance Court ruled that it must take this provision into account when deciding cases under the amended State Employees' Pensions Act.The court concluded that, in this case, applying the amended Act had reduced the total amount of X's pension to such an extent that the amendments must be considered to have caused an unreasonable and unexpected diminishing of X's accrued pension benefits.With reference to the preparatory materials of the amending Act and applying a "constitutional-rights affirmative" interpretation, the Insurance Court referred the matter back to the State Treasury for appropriate action.

22.4.2010 / 22.4.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 4.9.2008

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 1822; S2007/149

Reference to source

KKO 2008:83.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2008 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2008 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2008 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2009

Pages: pp. 597-601

Subject

pension, right to property,
pension, äganderätt,
eläke, omistusoikeus,

Relevant legal provisions

the State Employees' Pensions Act (280/1966); Act (638/1994) amending the State Employees' Pensions Act; sections 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag om statens pensioner (280/1966); lag om ändring av lagen om statens pensioner (638/1994); grundlagen 15 § och 106 §

= valtion eläkelaki (280/1966); valtion eläkelain muuttamisesta annettu laki (638/1994); perustuslaki 15 § ja 106 §

Abstract

A group of state employees had instituted proceedings against the state before the court of first instance.They claimed that in amending the State Employees' Pensions Act, the state had violated their basic civil rights, in particular their right to property, as prescribed in the Constitution Act and the ECHR.The complainants also asked the court to confirm that their pension would be determined by the Act as in force before the amendments, because this would be more beneficial to them.The court should also order the state to pay damages.The court of first instance dismissed the case on the grounds that pension issues do not fall within the jurisdiction of general courts.The court of appeal agreed with the lower court.Also the Supreme Court referred to the fact that the state employees' pension issues are decided in the first instance by the State Treasury and further by the Employee Pensions Appeal Board and the Insurance Court in the last instance.Under section 106 of the Constitution Act, a court may examine the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament only in relation to a matter which is being tried by the court.A court cannot thus assess on a general level whether a provision is in conflict with the Constitution.The Supreme Court held that it is not possible to assess the alleged violation of the complainants' basic and human rights, as manifested in reduced pension benefits, or the claim for compensation for violation of basic rights before it is determined how the State Employees' Pensions Act is applied in respect of the complainants.This decision rests in the final instance with the Insurance Court.In deciding pension issues, the Insurance Court shall, if necessary, also take into account section 106 of the Constitution Act and shall give primacy to the provision in the Constitution if a provision in the State Employees' Pensions Act is in evident conflict with the Constitution.A possible violation of basic rights can thus be avoided by applying section 106 of the Constitution Act, provided there are sufficient grounds thereto.The Supreme Court dismissed the case and upheld the decision of the court of appeal.

26.4.2010 / 26.4.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 19.3.2014

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 603; S2012/374

Reference to source

KKO 2014:14.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2014 January-June

Avgörande av Högsta domstolen 2014 januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2014 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2014

Pages: 107-116

Subject

paternity, respect for private life, right to property, equality,
faderskap, respekt för privatliv, äganderätt, jämlikhet,
isyys, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, omistusoikeus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

section 7-2 of the Act on the Implementation of the Paternity Act; sections 6, 10, 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag angående införande av lagen om faderskap 7 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 6 §, 10 §, 15 § och 106 §

= laki isyyslain voimaanpanosta 7 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 6 §, 10 §, 15 § ja 106 §.

ECHR-8; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

Twin sisters A and B had been born out of wedlock in 1959.They claimed that they had known since their childhood that C was their father and had believed that the paternity had been established by means of a child maintanance agreement which C had respected.In 2009, A and B filed a paternity suit and requested a DNA test.C objected to the confirmation of paternity.According to the transitional provisions of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act, a paternity suit in relation to a child who had been born out of wedlock before the entry into force of the Paternity Act (1 October 1976) had to be filed within five years from the entry into force of the Act (i.e., before 1 October 1981).Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal dismissed the claim on the grounds that the proceedings had not been initiated within the statutory time-limit.Both courts found that applying the time-limit did not in this case violate the right to private life as guaranteed in the Constitution Act and the ECHR.

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts.In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed at length the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights and referred also to its own decision in a precedent case (KKO 2012:11).The court noted that the assessment whether reasons favouring the granting of the right of appeal weigh heavier than the reasons speaking against it, must be made on a case-by-case basis and with an intent to reach a fair balance between the competing interests.Considering the statutory time-limit, the court found that A and B had had a real opportunity to have the paternity confirmed by a court within the time-limit and that the failure to do so was not due to reasons beyond their control.A and B had known the identity of their father long before the time-limit was imposed.They were 17 years old when the Paternity Act came into force and they reached the age of majority in 1977, which was more than four years before the time-limit expired.It would have been possible to have the paternity confirmed through a DNA test within the time-limit, because the mother and the putative father were both alive.In the court's view, the claim that A and B were not fully aware of the legislation on the establishment of paternity cannot as such be regarded as decisive.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that a child has, save in exceptional cases, a right to know of his or her biological father and a right to at least once bring an action for judicial recognition of paternity.However, the court noted that no support can be found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights for an interpretation that the child should have a right to freely choose the particular point in time when to file a paternity suit despite a statutory limitation period.The introduction of a time-limit for the institution of paternity proceedings may be justified by the desire to ensure legal certainty and finality in family relations.Therefore, the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the ECHR.

The Supreme Court continued that the confirmation of paternity, as falling within the scope of the right to private life, may be in conflict with the right to property in cases where the putative father, in relying on the statutory time-limit, has made arrangements concerning his property.Also, the child requesting the establishment of paternity may have expectations concerning inheritance.With reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court noted that the right to private and family life (Article 8) does not require the recognition of inheritance rights, except when taken together with the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14).In this case, C had relied on the legal state of affairs and the statutory time-limit and had made arrangements in order to transfer the large family farm to his daughter and heir.The Supreme Court concluded that applying the time-limit did not in this case violate the private life of A and B.

A and B had also claimed that restriction of their right to institute paternity proceedings amounted to discrimination in comparison with children born after the entry into force of the Paternity Act.The Supreme Court assessed whether there was reasonable justification for such a difference in treatment.It referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as well as to its own case law and noted that the time-limit can no longer be applied in a rigid and inflexible manner.The assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis and considering, in particular, whether a child has had a real opportunity to clarify the identiy of his or her father and to have the paternity confirmed by a court.Thus construed, restriction of the time allowed to institute paternity proceedings is possible, even considering the prohibition of discrimination.The court concluded that applying the time-limit in this case did not put A and B in a different position without acceptable justification, due to their date of birth, to those children who were born out of wedlock after the entry of the force of the Paternity Act.

23.12.2015 / 1.2.2016 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 19.3.2014

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 602; S2010/522

Reference to source

KKO 2014:13.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2014 January-June

Avgörande av Högsta domstolen 2014 januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2014 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2014

Pages: 98-106

Subject

paternity, respect for private life, right to property,
faderskap, respekt för privatliv, äganderätt,
isyys, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, omistusoikeus,

Relevant legal provisions

section 7-2 of the Act on the Implementation of the Paternity Act; sections 10, 15 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag angående införande av lagen om faderskap 7 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 10 §, 15 § och 106 §

= laki isyyslain voimaanpanosta 7 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 10 §, 15 § ja 106 §.

ECHR-8; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

X had been born out of wedlock in 1962.In 1982, X had learned from his mother that B was his father.After B's death in 2009, X filed a paternity suit on the basis of the 1975 Paternity Act in order to establish that B was his father.According to the transitional provisions of the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act, a paternity suit in relation to a child who had been born out of wedlock before the entry into force of the Paternity Act (1 October 1976) had to be filed within five years from the entry into force of the Act (i.e., before 1 October 1981).The suit could not be filed if the father was dead.The court of first instance dismissed X's claim on the grounds that the claim had been brought after the expiry of the five-year time-limit.The court of appeal found that considering his young age X had not had a real opportunity to file a paternity suit within the time-limit.However, the suit was not filed within a reasonable time.

The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal in that it had not been reasonable to expect that X, due to his age at the time, could have ascertained the identity of his biological father and filed a paternity suit within the time-limit.The court also referred to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Jäggi v.Switzerland (13 July 2006) and found that a mere passing of time did not in this case mean that X would have lost his right to ascertain the identity of this father by means of testing and to establish the relationship by means of a court decision.The Supreme Court also ruled that the death of the putative father can no longer form an independent and absolute obstacle for bringing a paternity claim, because today, paternity can be determined with certainty through DNA tests even after the man's death.

The Supreme Court held that in cases where a child, due to circumstances beyond his or her control, cannot bring a paternity suit in court within the prescribed time, denying the right to institute proceedings requires that there are extremely weighty and factual counter-arguments pertaining to the interests of the putative father or other persons.The court continued that according to the principle established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, a child has, save in exceptional cases, a right to know of his or her biological father and a right to at least once bring an action for judicial recognition of paternity.

The Supreme Court continued that the establishment of paternity, as falling within the ambit of the right to private life, may lead into a conflict with the right to property and possible arrangement made relying on the limitation period in the Implementing Act of the Paternity Act.B's estate consisted almost entirely of one half of the house where B and his family had lived.In 2003, B had made a will, naming one of his children as beneficiary.On the basis of the will and the Code of Inheritance, B's widow could continue to live in the family house.The Supreme Court held that when making a will, B had thus made arrangements in preparation for possible new claims to an inheritance as a result of the establishment of paternity.Although the establishment of B's paternity would provide X with an opportunity to present a claim to an inheritance, the interests of B's widow and children could not be deemed as weighty counter-arguments which would form sufficient grounds for denying X's right to bring a paternity suit.

The Supreme Court concluded that the application of the time-limit, as prescribed in the Implementation Act of the Paternity Act, would in this case be in evident conflict with the right to privacy, as provided for in section 10 of the Constitution.Under section 106 of the Constitution, primacy shall in such a case be given to the provision in the Constitution.In 2009, it had been established through DNA tests what B was X's biological father with 99,8 per cent certainty.B's widow and children had not denied this.The Supreme Court concluded that it had been proven that B was X's father and established the paternity.

23.12.2015 / 1.2.2016 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 14.12.2015

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2392; S2012/216

Reference to source

KKO 2015:92.

Electronic database for the decisions of the Supreme Court within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för Högsta domstolens beslut inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin Korkeimman oikeuden päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

paternity, respect for private life, right to property, access to court, fair trial,
faderskap, respekt för privatliv, äganderätt, rätt till domstolsprövning, rättvis rättegång,
isyys, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, omistusoikeus, oikeus tuomioistuinkäsittelyyn, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti,

Relevant legal provisions

Paternity Act; sections 15, 21 and 106 of the Constitution Act

= lag om faderskap; grundlagen 15 §, 21 § och 106 §

= isyyslaki; perustuslaki 15 §, 21 § ja 106 §.

ECHR-6; ECHR-8; ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

X's parents A and B had adopted C, who had been born out of wedlock.When A and B had died, their estate had been distributed between X and C.When C died, unmarried and without children, his heirs were his stepsister from his mother's side Y and X, who would only receive the share C had inherited from his adoptive parents.X claimed that she was also C's stepsister because her father A had in fact been C's biological father.As C's stepsister she would be entitled to a larger share of the estate.X then brought an action against Y and asked the court to confirm her status as C's stepsister.The court of first instance and the court of appeal dismissed X's action.

The Supreme Court considered the case on the basis of the Paternity Act, the Code of Inheritance and the procedure for the establishment of family relationships under the law of inheritance.The court found that establishing X's status as heir required the prior establishment of a relationship between C and his alleged biological father A following the procedure as prescribed in the Paternity Act.Neither A nor C had taken any action in order to establish the alleged paternity, and under the Paternity Act, X had no right of action.X's action should therefore be dismissed.

The Supreme Court then considered whether dismissing X's action was in conflict with the Constitution Act or human rights provisions binding on Finland.The Supreme Court acknowledged that X was as such C's heir and her undisputed right of inheritance, as confirmed in the distribution of C's estate, falls within the scope of the right to property.However, X's claim for a larger share of C's estate was not based on legitimate expectations which have a sufficient basis in Finnish law and was therefore not protected by the right to property in the meaning of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (Fabris v France, judgment of 7 February 2013, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2013).The Supreme Court also found that under the circumstances X's claim could not be accommodated within the right to private life ans provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR.A person cannot derive from Article 8 a right to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes (Haas v the Netherlands, judgment of 13 January 2004, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-I).Also, in the case of Menéndez García v Spain (decision of 5 May 2009), the European Court of Human Rights had declared the application manifestly ill-founded with regard to the right to private life, in a situation where the applicant had been refused her request to have her deceased father recognised as the son of a man she alleged was her deceased grandfather.Finally, the Supreme Court discussed the right of access to court in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (Menéndez García v Spain), and noted that states have a certain margin of appreciation in deciding whether to limit the group of persons with a right to bring an action to establish descent.The Supreme Court found there were weighty grounds for the legislative solution that the biological relationship between a father and his child is to be established solely within the procedure and the requirements as prescribed in the Paternity Act.This is in order to ensure legal certainty and to safeguard respect for the deceased and for the protection of their private life.Therefore, dismissing X's action did not violate her right of access to court or her right to a fair trial.

23.12.2015 / 23.12.2015 / RHANSKI